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ESTABLISHMENT AND JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRABILITY
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr.*

In Establishment and Fairness, Kent Greenawalt provides a
rich account of the establishment clause, eschewing reliance on a
single categorical test or overarching value. His method is "to
develop a sensible, nuanced approach to the religion clauses, one
that involves a number of debatable choices and does not reduce
to any simple formula." (p. 433 ). He identifies basic principles of
nonestablishment and proceeds to analyze specific establishment
clause problems in light of those principles. The analyses are
context-specific, value-inclusive, and carefully measured.
Even under Greenawalt's "totality of the circumstances''
approach, however, categorical rules emerge prohibiting government action as establishing religion. As such rules emerge,
certain government defenses to nonestablishment claims come
to fail not because they lack merit relative to the nonestablishment values that the categorical rule is meant to serve, but because they are judicially "unworkable" or "inadministrable." An
important question thus arises from Greenawalt's analysis of the
establishment clause and fairness: In a totality-of-thecircumstances approach to establishment clause claims, are government defenses systematically less judicially workable or administrable than establishment clause claims?
Categorical Rules in a Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test.
Totality-of-the-circumstances approaches to constitutional problems are subject to familiar critiques: In the name of "fairness,"
such tests (1) do not adequately serve interests in legal certainty;
(2) allow too much judicial discretion in ascribing relative
weights to the values that the analysis comprises; (3) provide
judges with cover for effectuating values that the analysis does
not properly comprise- through subconscious bias or conscious
* Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow. Notre Dame Law
School. I thank Tricia Bellia and Rick Garnett for helpful comments. and Steven D.
Smith for helpful conversations.
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subterfuge: and (4) require judges to make empirical determinations that judges are not well suited to make. "Categorical" approaches are subject to the opposite critique: In the name of certainty, limiting judicial discretion, etc., they preclude account of
values that, in fairness, a court should consider. Judges and
scholars have debated whether in given cases courts better fulfill
their role by accounting for the totality of facts and values a case
implicates, or by invoking more categorical rules that are certain
in application and limit judicial discretion. 1
Even under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, judges
recognize the need for certainty and workability in some measure. Thus, categorical rules that preclude consideration of salient
factors predictably emerge from totality-of-the-circumstances
inquiries. This dynamic is evident in Greenawalt's analysis. At
the outset, he identifies certain nonestablishment values that
bear on problems that arise under the establishment clause.
These values include protecting religious conscience, promoting
autonomy, avoiding corruption and intermingling of government
and religion, promoting equal dignity among citizens, and preserving equality (pp. 6-13). Certain of these values implicate interests of both believers and non-believers, religion and nonreligion, in a given context. For instance, to allow teaching about
religion in public schools may offend the dignity of nonbelievers, but to forbid it may offend the dignity of believers.
Likewise, to provide government funds to religious schools may
be unequal treatment relative to religions that lack schools, or
equal treatment relative to other schools that receive government funds. Having identified nonestablishment values,
Greenawalt develops specific nonestablishment principles (rules,
if you will) to guide judicial analysis of nonestablishment problems: "Governments cannot aid particular religions as such or
promulgate particular religious doctrines .... Governments also
may not aid religion in general as such or support religious ideas
that unite a high percentage of religious believers." (p. 15).
Unworkability and Government Defenses. As Greenawalt
applies these principles, certain government defenses to establishment claims prove judicially unworkable (at least anecdotally)-either because they would make a rule more difficult to

1. See, e.g.. Antonin Scalia. The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989): Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided. 110 HARV. L. REV.
4. 42-43 (1996).
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administer or because they are based on values that themselves
do not easily translate into a judicially administrable standard.
First, in Greenawalt's analysis, certain government defenses
to establishment claims fail because allowing them would make
it more difficult for judges to administer the rule supporting the
claim. For example, Greenawalt explores public education and
religion, including the place of religion in history courses.
Greenawalt raises a judicial workability concern in this context
that may lead to overenforcement of nonestablishment values.
As a general rule, Greenawalt argues, "religion should be accorded its fair place in history courses,'' but "teaching about the
place of religion in history should not inculcate any particular religious view" (p. 125). He proceeds to consider whether it violates nonestablishment for teachers to "identify their own religious outlooks, encourage free discussion of competing views,
and argue for their own views" (p. 125). Normally, he argues, it
would be a forbidden establishment for a Lutheran high school
teacher to say, "I am going to tell you what I think and why, presenting my position as forcefully as I can; but you should understand that this is not the school's official position and you are
free to form your own opinions." (p. 129). Students, Greenawalt
surmises, would not be "in a position to respond critically to the
teacher's forceful presentation" (p. 129). That said, he observes,
"such teaching might be appropriate for a small class of superbly
educated and sophisticated high school seniors" (p. 129). But he
would not allow such teaching to proceed in this circumstancethough it would not violate a nonestablishment principlebecause of workability concerns. He explains that "constitutional
principles need to be administrable by educators and judges. The
legal inquiry that an exception along these lines would require
would be too refined and too uncertain in outcome to be practical .... " (p. 129). Thus, a categorical rule emerges that teachers
may never identify and defend their own religious views, even if
in context their conduct undermines no salient nonestablishment
value.
In practice, then, as context-specific as Greenawalt's analysis
is, there comes a "stopping point" at which judges may not consider further refinements of context, though those refinements
may prove dispositive of the constitutional question. For the sake
of administrability, courts would hold a government act that in
fact comported with nonestablishment values to be a violation of
the establishment clause. In this way. administrability problems
result in the overenforcement of nonestablishment values.
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Second, certain government defenses to establishment
claims fail in Greenawalt's analysis because they are premised
on values that do not easily translate into judicially workable
standards. For example, Greenawalt considers whether government may provide general grants to all private nonprofit organizations, including religious ones, on a per member basis, as a
means of fostering good citizenship through civic participation
(pp. 391-92). Greenawalt argues that courts should hold such a
program unlawful under the establishment clause insofar as religious organizations could use the funds for "core religious activities'' (p. 392). Such use would violate his categorical principle of
"No Aid to Religious Organizations for Religious Activities" (p.
53). Any countervailing value, such as the "secular benefit" of
fostering "good citizenship., would be too '"amorphous" to factor
in judicial analysis, because "the state cannot measure benefits
to citizenship of participation in individual churches" (p. 392).
Greenawalt does not deny the value of good citizenship, but
relative to a formal principle of "no aid for religious activities,"
he finds it too amorphous to factor in judicial decision-making.
A Question Worth Considering. It is worth considering, under Greenawalt's analysis. whether government defenses to nonestablishment claims will systematically confront workability
problems, resulting in overenforcement of nonestablishment
principles. The answer depends in part on whether Greenawalt
has defined his nonestablishment principles in such a way that
legitimate nonestablishment values are more judicially workable
than legitimate countervailing values. Perhaps by definition, any
functional establishment clause inquiry will state more clearly
(and thus workably) principles that limit government action than
principles that enable government action notwithstanding such
limiting principles. (For instance, the Supreme Court has provided greater clarity on whether the First Amendment presumptively protects certain forms of speech than on what constitutes a
"compelling state interest" sufficient to justify a governmental
limitation on it.") Nonetheless, if governing principles aspire to
account case by case for all relevant values, the unworkability of
certain government defenses may call into question the formulation of the governing principles themselves. It also may reflect
the limits of judicial process in this context. If certain government defenses, reflecting real values, are inherently not judicially
2. See, e.g.. Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Strict Judicial Scrllliny. 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267.
1321-25 (2007) (describing how the Supreme Court has not adopted a clear approach to
identifying compelling governmental interests).

2008]

GREENAWALT ESSAYS

263

administrable, it is worth considering whether the judiciary, relative to other governmental institutions, is competent in all cases
to weigh the competing values that the establishment clause implicates. An enduring value of Greenawalt's book is that it
brings into focus questions such as these-and embraces by its
very approach their ongoing consideration.

